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Revenue Bubbles and Structural Deficits: What’s a state to do? 
The past two recessions have both proved alarming to state government finances. In 2001, a 
relatively shallow national recession led to a severe downturn in state revenues that took three 
years to unwind.  In the wake of the recent economic downturn, signs of fiscal stress are readily 
apparent.   In this paper, we investigate whether the revenue patterns surrounding these two 
recessions are the result of state government revenues having grown more sensitive to economic 
conditions.  We find that the responsiveness of revenues to measures of business cycle conditions 
has grown since the 1990s.  We use data on state government revenues, state specific information 
on economic conditions, and measures of state policy to examine fiscal performance and budgeting 
practice over the economic cycle.  Our findings suggest that increasing income cyclicality, in 
particular of capital gains, have made state revenues more responsive to the business cycle since 
the mid-1990s.  We also find that changes in policy making have served to increase revenue 
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1.  Introduction 
The fiscal condition of the states has been garnering headlines as governments confront 
difficult choices in their quest to close substantial budget gaps.  Budget gaps can arise because 
expenditures exceed anticipated levels or because revenues come in below forecasts. The 2007-
2009 recession led to pressure on both sides of the government ledger -- substantial declines in 
tax revenues were coupled with increasing expenditure pressures.  While some areas of the 
economy have been improving, state and local governments continue to struggle and cut over 
230,000 jobs in 2011.     
Throughout the recession, poor revenue numbers challenged state budgets.  The deep 
national recession was met with sharp declines in revenues.  (Dadayan and Boyd 2009b).  
Analysis of revenue patterns during the 2007-2009 recession point to declines in revenues that 
were broadly analagous to those observed during the 2001 recession.  In the 2001 recession, a 
modest recession led to disproportionate drops in revenues 
 In this paper, we investigate the relationship between state government tax revenues and 
economic conditions and ask whether changes in this relationship can explain the extent of the 
weakness in state revenues during the past two downturns.  We find that while government 
revenues have always responded to economic conditions, in the period since the late 1990s, this 
responsiveness has grown more pronounced.  We find that this increasing responsiveness has 
been concentrated in the individual income tax and is due partly to increasing cyclicality of 
income, particularly investment income, and partly due to changes in state income tax policy 
making.    
2.  Literature 
Numerous researchers have investigated the business cycle properties of state tax 
revenues, state tax bases, and state tax policy. Holcombe and Sobel  (1997) provide a book 
length treatment of the measurement and sources of cyclical variability.  They found that among 
the three major max bases, the corporate income tax was the most procyclical followed by the 
general sales tax base and the individual income tax base.  More recently, Dye (2004) offers a 3 
 
summary of the research strands and methodological issues involved in estimating the short run 
elasticity of revenues to the business cycle and the related long run responsiveness of revenues to 
economic growth.   He concludes that the methodology of Holcombe and Sobel is well suited to 
researching revenue cyclicality.  He also stresses the heterogeneity across states in economic 
cycles and revenue patterns.   
Interest in the business cycle properties of revenues increased in the wake of the 2001 
recession as researchers questioned why a modest national recession had led to a severe drop in 
revenues.  Maag and Merriman (2003) note that the fiscal crisis following the 2001 recession 
was characterized by a revenue drought rather than by a rapid expansion in expenditures.  They 
attribute some of this pattern to reluctance among policy makers to increase major taxes during 
the 2001 budget crisis.  Figure 1 displays net changes in the three major state tax revenue sources 
(sales, personal income and business income) from Fiscal Years 1988 to 2012 and shows that tax 
increases were modest in the period around the 2001 recession in comparison to period around 
the 1990 recession.  The authors suggest three factors contributed to this behavior: 1) new 
political constraints; 2) new legal constraints; and 3) unusual access to and appeal of short-term 
methods of coping.   A second factor that has been proposed as an explanation for the 2001 crisis 
is a pronounced drop in income tax revenues particularly due to declining capital gains income 
(Sjoquist and Wallace (2003) and Fox (2003)).  This in turn was blamed on the sharp drop in the 
stock market.   Sjoquist and Wallace (2003) further investigate the role of capital gains income 
by testing whether states that experienced an increase in per capita capital gains larger than the 
average state were more susceptible to the economic downturn.  They find that states with the 
more capital gains per capita in 1999 were more likely to face declines in tax revenues in 
FY2001 to FY2002.   Bruce, Fox and Luna (2009), Fox (2003) and Fox and Luna (2002) show 
that erosion in the sales and corporate income tax base also exacerbated the fiscal crisis of 2001.   
By reducing reliance on the portions of the tax base that hold up the best during downturns (such 
as food and drugs), states exacerbated the effects of the business cycle on their revenues.  This 
caused the corporate and sales taxes to perform particularly poorly during the economic 
slowdown.    
We add to this discussion by returning to the Holcombe and Sobel (1997) framework and 
asking whether something changed in the period surrounding the 2001 recession that led 4 
 
revenues to be more responsive to changing economic conditions.   We investigate three of the 
explanations highlighted in the literature on the revenue drought following the 2001 recession: 
changes in policy making, increased reliance on capital gains, and changes in the tax base 
outside of capital gains.  
Our paper proceeds as follows:  In Section 3, we discuss the state level panel data on 
quarterly revenue and economic conditions that we use to assess revenue cyclicality. In Section 4 
we introduce our methodology that follows in the tradition of Holcombe and Sobel (1997).   In 
Section 5, we document that a substantial increase in revenue cyclicality in the personal income 
tax occurred in the period leading up to the 2001 recession.  Section 6 focuses on explanations 
for the sources of this increased cyclicality and in particular examines changes in the dynamics 
of personal income and in state policy making.  In Section 7 we assess the relative magnitudes of 
the role of changing income dynamics and changing tax policy.  Section 8 concludes and 
discusses options available to policy makers.   
3.  Data 
We focus our investigation on the relationship between economic variables and state 
revenue performance from 1980-2011.  We choose this time span due to issues of data 
availability.   
 For state revenues we use the U.S. Census Bureau’s quarterly data on state government 
revenues for each state. The series is available from 1962 to 2011:Q3.  The series originally 
covered only general sales and gross receipts, motor fuel sales, individual income, and motor 
vehicle taxes.  In recognition of the changing revenue structure of the states, the series now 
covers 25 revenue sources.  The Data Appendix contains further information about this data 
source.  Throughout, we measure revenue in real per capita terms.   
To measure state specific economic cycles we use the state coincident indexes produced 
by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.  The coincident indexes use a dynamic single-
factor model to summarize state economic conditions into one single statistic.  The indexes 
combine data on four state-level indicators --  nonfarm payroll employment, average hours 
worked in manufacturing, the unemployment rate, and wage and salary disbursements deflated 
by the consumer price index.  The trend for each state’s index is set to the trend of its gross 5 
 
domestic product (GDP).  As a result, long-term growth in the state’s index matches long-term 
growth in its GDP and a one percentage point increase in the growth of the coincident index is 
roughly equivalent to a one percentage point increase in GDP growth.  The index is produced 
monthly but for our purposes it has been converted to a quarterly series and is available from 
1979-2011.
2  Our results are robust to using nonfarm payroll employment as an alternative 
measure of state economic conditions and to analyzing the longer time series for which this 
measure is available.
3  
For our investigation of the role of tax bases, we rely on annual state specific data from 
the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), Statistics of Income (SOI).  The IRS releases total Adjusted 
Gross Income (AGI) by state and breakdowns of this income into numerous different 
subcomponents.  Data on AGI is only currently available through 2009.     
In Table 1, we display quarterly variable means for the state level data for 1980-2011:Q3:   
columns 3 and 4 show growth rates, columns 5 and 6 show levels.  We display data for total tax 
revenues, for the three single largest state revenue sources; general sales, individual income 
taxes, and corporation net income taxes, for revenues excluding these three sources, which we 
label other revenues and for the coincident indicator.  We also include the means of four 
measures of annual real state per capita income and their growth rates based on the SOI data – 
total AGI, wage and salary income, investment earnings (capital gains, interest and dividends) 
and other income (primarily retirement income).   
The sample sizes for the growth rate calculations differ slightly across the different 
revenue sources due to missing data,  because certain states do not levy some taxes or because 
revenues are negative and thus we cannot compute growth rates, and because we delete some 
observations.
4   In particular, we delete observations for a given tax that are based on changes 
                                                           
2 Our quarterly index is the average of the monthly indexes.  For more information on the State Coincident Indexes 
see Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, 2011.  
3 The Employment data is available for the whole time period for which the revenue data is available (1962-2011).  
We prefer the coincident measure because it is a more comprehensive measure of state economic conditions.   
4 In the absence of missing data we would have 6350 observations (50 states for 4 quarters in 31.75 years (1980-
2011:Q3)).  For total tax revenues, we lose 69 observations due to missing revenue data and four due to huge swings 
in revenues – three of these in Alaska.  For income tax revenues, we lose 64 due to missing data, twelve for negative 
realizations of revenues, and 891 due to zero revenues (states that do not levy an income tax in a given quarter), 25 
due to large swings in revenues, and 244 due to the deletion of NH and TN.   In the regressions, we lose an 
additional 8 observations due to missing data on the coincident indicators for some states in1979. Including the 
observations with big swings does not alter our conclusions although the coefficients change modestly.  6 
 
from the first quarter when a new tax was introduced.   We also delete observations where 
revenue growth was over 200% or below -200% from one year to the next. Most of these 
observations are also related to the introduction of new taxes or to changes in the collection 
cycle.  For the individual income tax, we also delete observations for New Hampshire and 
Tennessee because the tax base is far narrower in these than in other states.
5   
The variable means show that revenues have been growing over the sample period, with 
revenue growth averaging 1.5%.   Sales tax revenue growth has been below individual income 
tax revenue growth on average, while corporate income tax revenues have been shrinking.   The 
coincident indicators have been trending up, by 2.2% on average.  Annual data on state per 
capita income show income has been growing as well with other income growing faster than 
wage and salary income and investment income. 
In Table 2, we present similar information for one cross section of the data – 1995:Q1, 
close to the midpoint of out sample.  We provide this second table of means to highlight the 
variation in revenue growth rates across states at a given point in time.  For instance while 
average total revenue growth was close to zero, the standard deviation was 0.12.   There is 
substantially less heterogeneity in revenue levels and in income amounts and growth rates.  
 
4.  Model 
We are interested in assessing the relationship of tax revenues to economic conditions.  A 
basic model capturing this relationship is: 
, ,, ln ln it i it it R EC αβ ε = ++
              (1.1)   
Equation (1.1)  relates state revenues (R) in state i at time t  to economic conditions (EC) in the 
state at time t. The variable β represents the elasticity of revenues to economic conditions.    
We do not estimate this equation, but instead estimate a transformed version of this 
equation: 
                                                           
5 New Hampshire and Tennessee tax only dividend and interest income.  7 
 
,4 ,4 ,4 ln ln it it it R EC αβ ε + ++ ∆ = +∆ +
           
(1.2) 
Where  ,4 ln it R + ∆  is the log difference in revenues between period t and period t+4, and 
,4 ln it EC + ∆  the log difference in economic conditions.   
We choose this transformation for three reasons.  First, estimates of β in equation (1.1) 
will be biased if the measures of revenues or of economic conditions are non-stationary.   By 
using growth rates, we transform these non-stationary series to ones that are stationary.  
Relatedly, the use of growth rates allows us to capture the short run, or cyclical, responsiveness 
of revenues because we are abstracting away from the long term relationship between economic 
conditions and revenues.  Most previous researchers investigating the business cycle properties 
of revenues have estimated equations in growth rates for these reasons.
6   Our third rational for 
this transformation is the result of our use of quarterly revenue data.  Quarterly revenue 
collections vary dramatically and systematically across the quarters of the calendar year. For 
instance sales tax receipts are particularly high in the fourth quarter due to holiday spending and 
income tax revenues are particularly high in the second quarter due to final tax payments. By 
calculating growth rates relative to the same calendar quarter one year prior, we minimize the 
role of these seasonal variations.     An alternative method to dealing with this timing issue 
would be to use annual revenue data.  We choose to use quarterly data rather than annual data 
because economic conditions often change within a calendar year and the quarterly data allow us 
to exploit the within year variation.  
The coefficient β  in equation (1.2) represents the average responsiveness of state 
government revenue growth to changes in state economic conditions or the economic condition 
elasticity of state government revenues.      If economic growth increases by 1 percentage point, 
we expect tax revenue growth to increase by β percentage points.  We label this responsiveness 
revenue cyclicality.  Tax revenue is procyclical if  0 β > while tax revenue is countercyclical if 
0 β < . 
                                                           
6 This is the transformation used in Holcombe and Sobel (1997).  It is also used in studies of business cycle revenue 
responses with data other than that for U.S. states.  See for example Priesmeier et. al. 2011.   Holcombe and Sobel 
(1997) also investigate an error correction model. As Dye (1994) points out, the results from the error correction 
model are quite close to those from the log-difference model presented here. 8 
 
5.  Revenue Cyclicality 
In Table 3, we show estimates of equation 1.2.  Traditional OLS regression is not 
appropriate in this context if errors are correlated within a given state over time or across states 
at a point in time.  We consider two potential standard error corrections.  First we consider panel 
corrected standard errors allowing for state specific AR(1) processes.  This correction allows for 
correlation across states a point in time as well as serial persistence within states.  Second, we 
use a cluster covariance matrix estimator following the work of Bester, Conley, and Hansen 
(2009).  In particular, we cluster the standard errors by region by half-decade.   Bester, Conley, 
and Hansen (2009) shows that inference based on clustering in this manner in the face of 
potentially serially and spatially correlated data performs well.   We choose the later standard 
error correction because it captures the spatial nature of our data.  In addition, the standard errors 
from this procedure tend to be modestly larger than the panel corrected standard errors indicating 
that this is a more conservative approach.   The panel corrected standard errors lead to 
substantively similar conclusions.    
  From the table we see that total tax revenue as well as revenue from each of the 
component tax sources is responsive to changing economic conditions.  The number 0.888 in the 
first column indicates that a 1 percentage point increase in the growth of the coincident index is 
related to a 0.9 percentage point increase in the growth of revenues.   Corporate income tax 
revenue is the most cyclically sensitive revenue source, followed by personal income tax 
revenues, and sales tax revenues.  Other tax revenues are the least responsive to economic 
conditions.   
We have established the link between revenues and economic conditions at the state 
level.  Next we turn to the issue of whether this relationship changed as we approached the 2001 
recession.   Rather than assume that a break occurred at a particular juncture, we allow the data 
to tell us whether a break occurred and if so when.  In particular, following Andrews (1993), we 
use Quandt Likelihood Ratio tests (QLR) with 15% trimming to both determine whether there 
was a break in the data and also to discover when the break occurred.    We look for a break 
using the data on total tax revenues and allowing breaks to occur between one year and the next 
(between the fourth quarter of one year and the first quarter of the next year).  A break is defined 
as a change in the average growth rate of revenues across all states as well as a change in the 
cyclicality of revenues.  In particular, we estimate the following equation:  9 
 
  ,4 1 2 1 ,4 2 ,4 ,4 ln ln ln it it it it R break EC break EC αα β β ε + + ++  ∆ = + + ∆ + ×∆ +    (1.3) 
Where break=1 if the observation occurs after the hypothesized break time.  The coefficient  2 α
allows for a different level of revenue growth before and after the break while the coefficient  2 β
allows for different cyclicality.     We jointly test the coefficients  2 α and  2 β .  For total tax 
revenues, the data point to a break occurring in 2000.  Going forward, we assume that a break 
occurred in 2000.
7   As a result, the version of equation (1.3) that we present is: 
,4 1 2 1 ,4 2 ,4 ,4 ln ( 1999) ln ( 1999) ln it it it it R post EC post EC αα β β ε + + ++  ∆ = + + ∆ + ×∆ +    (1.4) 
Table 4 shows estimates of  1 α ,  2 α ,  1 β ,and  2 β  for total tax revenues and for the four 
different subcategories of tax revenues.    We see that overall revenues are more sensitive to 
economic conditions in the later period than they were in the earlier period.  Prior to 2000, a one 
percentage point increase in economic growth was related to a 0.7 percentage point increase in 
tax revenue growth.  In 2000 and after, a one percentage point increase in economic growth was 
related to a 1.3 percentage point increase in revenue growth.   While sales tax revenue cyclicality 
and other tax revenue sensitivity has been essentially unchanged, individual income tax revenue 
cyclicality has quadrupled.  While a one percentage point change in the growth of the coincident 
index was related to a 0.6 percentage point change in individual income tax revenue growth prior 
to 2000, it corresponds to a 2.1 percentage point change during the 2000-2011:Q3 period.  This 
confirms the findings of other studies that a change in income tax receipts has dominated 
revenue patterns (see Sjoquist and Wallace, 2003).   We also find a large negative coefficient on 
the post 2000 dummy in the individual income tax regression. In the later period, annual income 
tax revenue growth rates declined by 3 percentage points relative to the earlier period.  This may 
be the result of legislated income tax reductions during the 1990s (see Figure 1) or national 
changes in the income tax base that affected most states.  Corporate income tax revenue shows a 
similar pattern to individual income tax revenues – cyclicality has doubled.  In the remainder of 
                                                           
7 The 1% threshold for the QLR statistic with 2 restrictions is 7.8, the 10% threshold is 5.  The QLR for overall tax 
revenue is 19.3 (in 2000).  It is 36.6  for the income tax (in 2000).   Quarterly data point to breaks for overall 
taxation in 1999:Q4 and for the income tax in 2000:Q1.    We don’t want to interpret this result as indication that 
something specific occurred in 2000 because the underlying Wald test is above 7.8 for the entire period from 1991-
2005 for the income tax and above 7.8 from 1998-2005 for overall tax revenues. The QLR for the sales tax is 8.4 in 
1987.  Insofar as there was a change in the sales tax it occurred earlier. The QLR is below 5 for other taxes.   10 
 
this paper we focus on the growing sensitivity of individual income tax revenues because it is a 
large revenue source (about five times corporate collections) that has grown far more sensitive.   
In Table 5, we show that this increase in individual income tax cyclicality is robust to the 
inclusion of state and date fixed effects in our regression.  Inclusion of state dummies (column 2) 
has a very small impact on our estimated coefficients.  We fail to reject that the state fixed 
effects have no effect on income tax revenue growth.  We find similar results for the other types 
of taxes.  We estimate the remaining regressions in the paper without state fixed effects.  
Including date fixed effects in the form of year-quarter dummies reduces our estimates of 
cyclicality (column 3), but we continue to see an increase in cyclicality after 2000.   When we 
include the date fixed effects we are relying on cross state variation in economic conditions.  
Going forward, we estimate our models without these date effects and interpret our coefficient 
on the coincident index as measuring the effect of both national and state specific economic 
conditions.   
In Table 6, we show the cyclicality of individual income tax revenues separately for each 
of the expansions and contractions over the past three decades based on National Bureau of 
Economic Research (NBER) business cycle dates.   We do this to investigate whether the change 
in cyclicality occurred primarily in one phase of the business cycle.  This table shows that the 
increased responsiveness of income tax revenues to economic conditions occurred during both 
the expansionary and contractionary periods since 2001:Q1.   
 
6.  Sources of Increasing Sensitivity 
Having established that individual income tax sensitivity to business cycle conditions has 
increased both during recent recessions and recent contractions, we seek to address why this 
increase has occurred. Tax revenues derive from an intersection between the tax base and tax 
rate.   The base is measured by what and who we tax while tax rates are determined by state tax 11 
 
policies.
8  In the next two sections, we separately investigate increased sensitivity of the income 
tax base and the income tax rate.  
 
Changes in the Base 
There are two potential ways to think about the income tax base.  We can think of the 
base as the income of individuals who reside in the state or are otherwise obligated to pay taxes 
to the state.  We call this the exogenous base.   Alternative, we can think about the base as the 
income that policy makers subject to the tax.  We call this the selected base.  For example, 
retirement income is not subject to income tax in Illinois. Retirement income is part of the 
exogenous base, but not part of the selected base.  
We investigate increasing cyclicality for both types of base measurement.  In order to 
measure the exogenous base, we use AGI per capita of state residents as reported to the IRS on 
Federal returns and released to the public in the Statistic of Income data.  We choose this 
measure of the tax base because it is collected in a consistent manner across all states, is 
available for a substantial enough period of time to address our question of interest, and contains 
information about income earned from different sources.  In particular, the data contains 
information on wage and salary income, investment income, and other income separately.  
However, this is not a perfect measure of the exogenous base for two reasons.  First, it may 
include some income reported to the IRS by state residents that the state cannot tax.  This is the 
case because a resident may owe taxes to a state different from the one in which he resides.  This 
is particularly true of states that do not have reciprocal agreements with other states.  Second, 
this measure of income may not be exogenous to the tax rate.  Research on tax rates shows a 
positive relationship between tax rates and Federal AGI indicating that state policy may 
influence the reported base.  (Bruce, Fox and Yang 2010).   We use this measure of the base 
keeping in mind these weaknesses. 
                                                           
8 Federal tax policies are also potentially quite important because states often piggyback on Federal decisions.  We 
label all of these state tax policies because states can choose how to incorporate Federal choices into their tax 
systems. 12 
 
As our measure of the selected base, we follow Bruce, Fox and Yang (2010) and 
calculate the per capita base as income tax revenues per capita divided by the top marginal tax 
rate.
9  Bruce, Fox and Yang (2010) justify using of the top marginal rate because in most states, 
this rate kicks in at a fairly low level of income.  There are some weaknesses with this measure 
as well.   First, it is not available for those states that lack an income tax.  Second, we only 
calculate one measure so we cannot break the base down by the different sources of income.  
Finally, this measure of the base has a systematic relationship with economic conditions because 
better economic conditions imply that more income is covered by the top marginal rate due to tax 
progressivity.  As a result, this measure understates the tax base to a greater degree when 
incomes are low.   
In this section, we ask whether growth in real AGI  per capita or its components, or the 
selected base have become more sensitive to economic conditions.  To do so, we use various 
measures of income as the dependent variable and estimate the following equation.  
,1 1 2 1 ,1 2 ,1 ,1 ln ( 1999) ln ( 1999) ln iy iy iy iy Inc post EC post EC αα β β ε + + ++  ∆ = + + ∆ + ×∆ +  (1.5) 
 Inc refers to adjusted gross income or one of its components, or to the selected base.  The 
variable y refers to the year, as opposed to the quarterly t.  We estimate this equation on annual 
data because AGI is only available annually.  We measure annual economic conditions based on 
an annual version of the coincident index.   
In Table 7 we show estimates of equation (1.5) for AGI, wage and salary income, 
investment income, other income, and the selected base.  Investment income includes capital 
gains, interest and dividends.  Other income is primarily comprised of retirement income.  The 
table shows that overall income cyclicality nearly doubled and that while wage and salary 
income grew modestly more cyclical, investment income grew massively more cyclical.  While 
prior to 2000, a one percentage point increase in economic growth was related to a 0.5 
percentage point increase in investment income growth, after 2000, it was related to a 5.6 
                                                           
9 We cannot use the state base as reported to tax authorities as is done in Bruce, Fox and Yang (2010) because the 
data are not available for enough time or states.    13 
 
percentage point increase.  In the final column of the table, we show that the cyclicality of the 
selected base also increased.
10     
While some of the increase in cyclicality of investment income is probably due to 
increasing cyclicality and volatility of stock market returns, some may be due to issues related to 
the strategic timing of capital gains realizations.   Capital gains are reported to the IRS and taxed 
based on when they are realized rather than when they accrue.  As a result, taxpayers have some 
ability to time capital gains realizations at the most tax advantaged juncture.  In particular, 
taxpayers have an incentive to time gains when they face a lower tax rate which can occur either 
because they are in a lower bracket in some years than others or because the entire capital gains 
structure is lower in some years than in others.  One factor that may have influenced the pattern 
of capital gains income in our data series is the drop in tax rates in 2003.  Insofar as this was 
anticipated, taxpayers had an incentive to hold off on realizing gains until the lower tax rates 
went into effect.  This may partly explain the substantial drops in capital gains realizations in 
2001 and 2002, which also corresponded to a period of economic weakness.  Tax rates on 
dividends fell at the same time giving shareholders an incentive to ask corporations to delay 
dividends.  We investigate this further by adding year fixed effects into the regressions 
predicting our various measures of the base.  We present results in Table 8.   In the case of 
investment income, these fixed effects control for federal capital gains policy, annual stock 
market behavior, and other features that were consistent across states.  These estimates depend 
solely on cross sectional heterogeneity in changes in economic conditions.  We now observe a 
modest and insignificant increase in cyclicality, rather than the nearly 11 fold increase presented 
earlier.  This suggests that features that varied over time, including both federal tax policy and 
other things such as stock market returns, rather than across states, explain a large portion, of the 
increase in investment income cyclicality.
11 
  Our analysis of changes in the base confirms that increased cyclicality of income can 
partly explain the increase cyclicality of income tax revenues.  We next investigate the effects of 
                                                           
10 One issue with this equation is that wage and salary income is one of the components coincident index.  To move 
away from worry that we are regressing the growth of wage and salary income a transformed version of itself, we 
also regressed our measures of base growth rates on growth rates of state employment and observed a similar pattern 
of results. 
11 We also investigated whether changes in the distribution of income affected revenue cyclicality by dividing states 
into groups based on their income dispersion.   We find some differences across groups of states but conclude that 
the increase in cyclicality was a broad based phenomenon.   14 
 
changes in income tax rate setting policy on revenue sensitivity.  We conjecture that since 2000, 
one of the reasons for the increase in business cycle sensitivity has been changes in policy 
making as highlighted by Magg and Merriman (2003).   Even if the income tax base had not 
become more cyclical, if the method of determining tax rates had changed we could observe 
changes in income tax revenue cyclicality.   
Changes in Rates 
In order to investigate whether tax rate setting policy has changed we look at income tax 
policy parameters using data from three sources.  First, we divide annual income tax revenues by 
annual state AGI to find out the portion of resident income that is collected by the state.  We 
label this the average effective tax rate.  Second, we use the measures of marginal tax rates 
calculated from the TAXSIM model developed by Dan Feenberg at the NBER.  The model 
provides information on the maximum marginal state tax rate paid on wage income, long term 
capital gain income and mortgage interest by state through 2011.  The model also provides the 
average (dollar weighted) marginal state tax rate on wage income, capital gains income, pension 
income and other sources of income through 2011.  The average marginal tax rate data is 
provided in three ways – based on the actual state distribution of income in the year in question, 
based on the state distribution of income in 1995, and based on the national distribution of 
income in 1995.  We use tax rates based on the 1995 national income distribution because we 
believe it best isolates the role of state tax policy.
 12     Third, we use data on the top marginal 
income tax rate on the state’s tax schedule.
13  The top rate on the schedule and the top rate paid 
differ because the top paid rate takes the deductibility of state taxes paid to federal authorities 
into account.   
We use these data to look at whether the determination of effective, average and 
maximum state tax rates has changed since 1999.  To do this, we use changes in the tax rate as 
the dependent variable.   We investigate the relationship between the change in economic 
conditions and the change in tax rates, by estimating the following equation: 
                                                           
12 Data is available from the NBER at http://www.nber.org/~taxsim/marginal-tax-rates/.   
13 This data was collected from The Tax Foundation (2011), the World Almanac and Book of Facts (Various Years), 
and the Book of the States (Various Years).   15 
 
,1 1 2 1 ,1 2 ,1 ,1 ln ( 1999) ln 1999 ln iy iy iy iy Rate post EC post EC αα β β ε + + ++  ∆ = + + ∆ + ×∆ +  (1.6) 
 The results for our different measures of tax rates are presented in Table 9.   In the first 
column of Table 9, we show that effective tax rates went from being modestly countercyclical 
prior to 2000 to very procyclical. Prior to 2000, a one percentage point increase in the coincident 
index corresponded to a 0.5 percentage point drop in effective rates.  After 2000, the same 
increase in the coincident index corresponded to a 1.1 percentage point increase in rates. 
Changes in effective rates cofound two phenomena; effective rates may change due to policy 
decisions, alternatively rates may change because of changes in the distribution of income across 
individuals or sources.   For example, a transfer of one dollar from a poor household to a higher 
income household that is taxed at a higher marginal rate would increase revenues but would not 
increase AGI so it would lead to an increase in effective rates.  In order to isolate the effects of 
policy, in columns (2)-(6) we present rates that are not a function of changes in the distribution 
of income.  In Column (2), we present results based on changes in maximum marginal tax rates 
on wages from the TAXSIM model.  We find that rates were strongly countercyclical prior to 
2000.  When the economy was shrinking more quickly, legislators increased rates to stabilize 
revenues.  By contrast, when economic conditions improved more rapidly rates were reduced.  
By contrast, beginning in 2000, rates became less countercylical.   We discern a similar pattern 
for average marginal rates on wages (Column 4), and top marginal rates (Column 7).  For rates 
on capital income (Columns(3) and (5)), we observe that rates were consistently countercyclical 
before and after 2000.  For pension income (Column 6) we find that average rates changed from 
being countercyclical to being acyclical.
14   
  We can also see evidence of the change in policy making if we look at enacted revenue 
changes as displayed in Figure 1.  During the 1990-1991 recession, 13 states enacted revenue 
increases while four states enacted decreases yielding a net $2.9 Billion increase in personal 
income tax revenues for Fiscal Year 1991.  (NASBO September 1990).  By contrast, during the 
2001 recession, three states increased personal income taxes and 12 states decreased them 
leading to a net $0.7 Billion drop in revenues for Fiscal Year 2002 (NASBO December 2001).   
The tax increases for FY2010 (NASBO December 2009) were also fairly dramatic, but they are 
difficult to compare because the recession was much more severe.  Our investigation of tax rates 
                                                           
14 There is no data on maximum marginal rates on pension income.   16 
 
indicates that changes in tax policy also work in the correct direction to party explain the 
increase in cyclicality since 1999.  While policy had traditionally been strongly countercyclical, 
in particular in terms of tax rates on wages and pensions, and would serve to dampen the 
response of revenues to the economic cycle, policy became less countercyclical in the later 
period.  
  
7.  Contributions of the Rate and the Base 
From the previous two sections were learn that changes in the tax base, particular in capital 
income, served to increase revenue cyclicality while changes in tax rate policy, particularly 
pertaining to wage and pension income also served to increase revenue cyclicality.  Both of these 
can partially explain the changes in revenue cyclicality we have observed.  In order to bring the 
information in the previous two sections together, we perform some calculations where we 
compare the magnitude of these two effects.   
We can break annual revenue growth into that attributed to the base and that attributed to the 
rate recognizing that average revenues are equal to the average base times the average rate and 
taking advantage of the convenient properties of logarithms: 
( ) ( ) ,1 1 1 ,1 ,1 ln ln ln ln ln tt t t t t tt tt R Rate Base Rate Base Rate Base + ++ + + ∆ = × − × =∆ +∆  
Because revenue growth is equal to the sum of base growth and rate growth, we can divide 
revenue growth into base and rate growth and as a result can divide revenue cyclicality and 
increases in cyclicality into that attributable to the rate and the base.   To do this we need a 
measure of revenues, the rate, and the base that are consistent with one another.  In other words, 
we need a measure of revenues that is equal to a measure of the base multiplied by a measure of 
the rate.  However, the measures of revenues, rates, and bases used in the previous sections are 
from different sources and not consistent with one another.   We develop four combinations of 
revenues, income tax rates, and the income tax base that are internally consistent to investigate 
the relative contributions of the tax rate and tax base to revenue cyclicality. 17 
 
 For our first combination, we create simulated revenues using the NBER TAXSIM data and 
the IRS SOI data.  In particular, we generate an estimate of tax revenues by combining the SOI 
data on income by source and the NBER estimates of average (dollar weighted) marginal tax 
rates on income by source.  We use the average marginal tax rates that are based on 1995 
national income distributions to isolate the role of tax policy.  We measure income tax revenues 
derived from wage and salary income by multiplying wage and salary income per capita from 
SOI by the average marginal tax rate on wage and salary income.  We do this for wage income, 
capital gains income, interest income, dividend income, and other income and generate an 
estimate of total income tax revenues by summing across these sources.  We multiply other 
income by the tax rate on pensions assuming that most other income derives from pensions.   
This gives us an estimate of tax revenues that measures what revenues would be if all income 
reported to the IRS by state residents was taxed at its average marginal rate.  This alternative 
estimate of revenues is highly correlated (.95) with actually revenues but is higher in most cases 
because average marginal tax rates are higher than average tax rates due to standard deductions, 
personal exemptions, and tax rate progressivity.   We come up with a single measure of the 
average tax rate across all income sources by dividing our simulated revenues by AGI.   
 In the first three columns of tables 10 we show regression results based on these measures.   
The first column shows estimates of the level and increase of cyclicality for estimated revenues, 
the second for rates, and the third for the base (AGI).   Using these estimates, we measure the 
percent of the level of revenue cyclicality, both pre and post 2000, and the percent of the increase 
in revenue cyclicality that is attributable to the base and the rate.  We display these percentages 
in Table 11.   
First, from the first three columns of row 1 of Table 10, we note that the low level of revenue 
cyclicality pre-2000 is the result of cyclical income being counteracted by countercyclical rates.   
From the second row of Table 10, we see that the increase in cyclicality was due to both the rates 
and the base.   According to the second row of Table 11, 63% of the increase was due to changes 
in the cyclicality of rates while 37% was due to changes in the cyclicality of the base.
15  In the 
final row of Table 11, we show that post-2000 nearly all of the cyclicality was due to the base, 
                                                           
15 Average tax rates can change because of changes in policy or because changes in the distribution of income across 
sources.  In practice, changes in the distribution of income across sources has very little effect on the results.  We 
find nearly identical results if we fix the distribution of income across sources and only allow the rates to vary.     18 
 
with rates being close to neutral.  The drawback of this estimate is that the measures of revenue 
cyclicality both before and after 2000 are lower than in actual data (in Column 4).  This arises 
because this simulation fails to take into account the increase in revenues that occurs during good 
times because of the interaction between the rate and the base.  In particular, when economic 
conditions improve and incomes increase, average tax rates increase because of the progressivity 
of the income tax.   By measuring tax policy based on a fixed income distribution and by using 
marginal rates rather than average rates, we lose this effect. 
For our second set of estimates we use data on actual revenues as our revenue measure, data 
on state AGI for our base measure, and data on the effective tax rate for our rate measure.  (As 
before, effective rates are equal to revenues divided by AGI).  Results are presented in columns 
4-6 of Table 10 and columns 3-4 of Table 11.  The results here also point to countercyclical rates 
being counteracted by a cyclical base prior to 2000 and the majority of the increase in cyclicality 
being attributed to the increasing rate cyclicality. In contrast to the first simulation, both cyclical 
rates and a cyclical base contribute post 2000.  In this case, because we are using actual 
revenues, we capture the increase in revenues in good times that results from tax progressivity.  
However, we attribute all of the increase in cyclicality from this interaction to rates because of 
our use of effective rates.  As a result, this estimate overstates the role of policy because some of 
the increase in rate cyclicality is a direct result of income cyclicality not a result of policy 
choices. 
Our third measure uses data on actual revenues as our measure of revenues, data on the 
average marginal tax rates based on the NBER data as our rate measure (as in our first 
combination), and calculates the base as revenues divided by the tax rate.  We call the resulting 
base the estimated base.  The measures of cyclicality of actual revenues differs modestly in this 
case (Column 7) from the previous example (Column 4) because the samples are slightly 
different.  We again find that prior to 2000, a cyclical base was counteracted by countercyclical 
rates.  We also see that both rate and base cyclicality increased post-2000.  In this example we 
attribute about two-thirds of the increase in cyclicality to the base.   The base matters more in 
this calculation than in the previous two because by keeping rates fixed at policy rates, this 
calculation assigns the increase in revenues that occurs when the economy improves to the base.   19 
 
Our final measure of revenues also uses data on actual revenues as our measure of revenues.  
However, we use data on the top marginal rate as our measure of the tax rate, and data on the 
selected base (revenues divided by the top marginal rate) as our base measure.  Here we find an 
even larger contribution of the base. 
These four breakdowns reinforce the finding presented earlier that rate and base cyclicality 
both contributed to increasing revenue cyclicality.  They also highlight that the challenge in 
assigning relative contributions to the rate and the base is how to account for the increase in 
effective rates that occurs when income grows due to tax progressivity.  Our preferred 
breakdown is the third one because by using rates based on a fixed income distribution it isolates 
the role of policy choices.  In this case, the base measurement is a residual that captures the part 
of revenue growth not captured by policy.   Insofar as rates increase due to income changes, this 
breakdown assigns the resulting revenue increase to the base.  This breakdown attributes 69% of 
the increase in cyclicality to the base and 31% to rates.    
As an additional exercise, we take advantage of the fact that the NBER provides information 
on marginal rates on different types of income and that the IRS data provides information on 
income from different sources.   Using this data, we investigate increases in the cyclicality of 
revenues from three different sources – wages, investment income and other income.  We 
estimate revenues by source by multiplying NBER rates by source and SOI income by source.   
We then break revenue cyclicality from these three sources into contributions due to the rate and 
the base. We present our findings in Table 12   We find that increases in cyclicality occurred for 
revenues from both wage and investment income.  Revenues from other income work in the 
direction opposite our main findings, namely that revenue cyclicality fell.  When we divide the 
growth in cyclicality into that due to rates and that due to the base, we find that for wage income, 
the majority (82%) of the increase was due to rates while for investment income, the majority 
(95%) of the increase was due to the base.     
 
8.  Conclusion 
  We find that state tax revenues have become far more sensitive to changing economic 
conditions since 2000 and that increasing responsiveness in the individual income tax has been 20 
 
an important source of this increase.  We divide our discussion of individual income taxes into 
investigations into changes in rates and changes in the base and confirm that both were important 
contributors.  In particular, personal income growth became more responsive to economic 
conditions – especially investment income, but also wage and salary income.  At the same time, 
income tax rate policy transitioned from being countercyclical to being less countercyclical or 
even modestly procyclical.  Our preferred breakdown attributes 69% of the increase in cyclicality 
to the base and 31% to rates.  Further breakdowns suggest that most of the increase in the 
cyclicality of the base was due to investment income while most of the increase in the cyclicality 
of rates was due to takes on wages.    
  One question that remains is what states should do about this increase in cyclicality.  The 
state response depends on whether the increased cyclicality of revenues is likely to persist or 
whether revenue responsiveness is anticipated to revert back to the patterns observed through the 
mid-1990s.  It is possible that the behavior of income in the years since 2000 has been 
anomalous and is unlikely to persist.  For instance, we may view the run up in the NASDAQ and 
its subsequent decline as onetime events that influenced the cyclicality of income.  In addition, 
some of the elevated cyclicality of capital income may be due to strategic responses to changes 
in tax policy that coincided with the economic cycle.  Federal tax policy may again induce 
strategic capital gains realizations, but these may not coincide with economic conditions in the 
same manner.  However, part of the increase in income cyclicality may be connected with 
structural changes in labor markets that have led to increased income and wealth inequality and 
increased income cyclicality at the top of the income distribution (Parker and Vissing-Jorgenson 
2010).  These trends are long standing and unlikely to reverse themselves.   In keeping with this, 
the state revenue response to the current recession has certainly been dramatic and has been more 
consistent with the post-2000 than pre-2000 experiences.  In other words, it does not appear that 
any reversion to pre-2000 norms has occurred yet.    
  Given that states may continue to face these large swings the income tax base, 
policymakers should consider ways to adapt.  Policy makers could return to the pre-2000 method 
of adjusting tax rates up during recessions and down during booms to moderate the effect of the 
business cycle on revenues.  Alternately, states could increase their reliance on Rainy Day Funds 
by saving more during good times and draw down balances during recessions.  Recognizing the 21 
 
influence of capital gains on revenue fluctuations, Massachusetts recently arranged for excess 
capital gains revenues to be transferred into the state’s rainy day fund (Ross 2009).  Finally, the 
Federal government could adjust grants to provide more help during recessions and fewer 
resources during booms.  
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Figure 1: Net Enacted Policy Changes in Current Dollars: FY1988-FY2012 
 
 Source: National Association of State Budget Officers, Fiscal Survey of the States, Various Issues.  These 
are enacted revenue changes for the current fiscal year based on mid-fiscal year data.  In some cases 
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Table 1: Quarterly Variable Means, 1980-2011:Q3 
 










Total State Tax Revenues Per 
Capita 6277 0.015 0.124 506.073 240.353
State Sales Tax Revenues Per 
Capita 5643 0.014 0.129 150.792 83.882
State Individual Income Tax 
Revenues Per Capita 5114 0.019 0.220 148.446 107.896
State Corporate Income Tax 
Revenues Per Capita 5548 -0.033 0.403 33.660 55.131
Total State Other Revenues Per 
Capita 6208 0.011 0.158 172.363 189.080
Coincident Indicator 6342 0.022 0.039 116.382 32.019
Annual Data
Adjusted Gross Income  Per 
Capita 1500 0.015 0.045 20324.920 5405.832
Wage and Salary Income Per 
Capita 1500 0.010 0.029 15248.220 3506.290
Capital Gains, Interest and 
Dividend Income Per Capita 1500 0.005 0.192 2337.604 1047.929
Other Income Per Capita 1484 0.054 0.314 2739.093 1528.054
Year Over Year Log Difference Level
**Dollar amounts are in $2007 dollars and calculations are based on 2007$.  Level calcuations include zeros for states that 
do not levy a given tax, outliers and all states with available data. 26 
 
Table 2: Variable Means, 1995:Q1 
 










Total State Tax Revenues Per Capita 50 -0.003 0.122 466.26 118.833
State Sales Tax Revenues Per Capita 45 0.015 0.096 148.96 76.896
State Individual Income Tax 
Revenues Per Capita 40 0.010 0.130 133.55 87.691
State Corporate Income Tax 
Revenues Per Capita 45 0.010 0.310 26.81 18.958
Total State Other Revenues Per 
Capita 50 0.000 0.174 156.94 95.145
Coincident Indicator 50 0.053 0.020 113.41 5.429
Annual Data
Adjusted Gross Income  Per Capita 50 0.034 0.012 19622.55 3221.409
Wage and Salary Income Per Capita 50 0.021 0.012 14784.78 2559.495
Capital Gains, Interest and Dividend 
Income Per Capita 50 0.136 0.044 1913.07 524.624
Other Income Per Capita 50 0.035 0.026 2924.69 441.434
**Dollar amounts are in $2007 dollars and calculations are based on 2007$.  Level calcuations include zeros for 
states that do not levy a given tax, outliers and all states with available data. 
Year Over Year Log 
Difference Level27 
 
Table 3: Cyclical Responsiveness of State Tax Revenues: 1980-2011:Q3 
 
   


























Year over Year Log Difference in Coincident Indicator 0.888*** 0.860*** 1.139*** 2.304*** 0.488***
(0.0834) (0.0718) (0.178) (0.291) (0.0921)
Constant -0.00406 -0.00483 -0.00489 -0.0832*** 0.000364
(0.00377) (0.00306) (0.00746) (0.00986) (0.00364)
Observations 6,269 5,635 5,109 5,543 6,200
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Standard errors are clustered by region by half decade28 
 





   


























Year over Year Log Difference in Coincident Indicator 0.714*** 0.823*** 0.638*** 1.853*** 0.544***
(0.0764) (0.0958) (0.111) (0.173) (0.127)
Log Difference in Coincident Indicator 2000 and After 0.610*** 0.0761 1.502*** 1.967*** -0.0289
(0.106) (0.138) (0.178) (0.508) (0.189)
Dummy=1 if 2000 or Later -0.00389 -0.00427 -0.0298** 0.00791 0.0139*
(0.00625) (0.00578) (0.0108) (0.0203) (0.00743)
Constant -0.000651 -0.00265 0.0128 -0.0820*** -0.00600
(0.00414) (0.00389) (0.00811) (0.00831) (0.00496)
Observations 6,269 5,635 5,109 5,543 6,200
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Standard errors are clustered by region by half decade29 
 
 
Table 5: Income Tax Revenue Cyclicality, With State and Date Fixed Effects 


















Year over Year Log Difference in Coincident Indicator 0.638*** 0.682*** 0.223 0.287
(0.111) (0.0987) (0.185) (0.183)
Log Difference in Coincident Indicator 2000 and After 1.502*** 1.502*** 1.019*** 1.073***
(0.178) (0.164) (0.276) (0.320)
Dummy=1 if 2000 or Later -0.0298** -0.0282***
(0.0108) (0.00932)
Constant 0.0128 0.00760 0.0667*** 0.0570*
(0.00811) (0.0127) (0.0231) (0.0285)
Observations 5,109 5,109 5,109 5,109
State Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes
Date Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Standard errors are clustered by region by half decade30 
 
Table 6: Individual Income Tax Revenue Cyclicality during Expansions and Contractions 
 
   

























Period Contraction Expansion Contraction Expansion Contraction Expansion Contraction Expansion Contraction Expansion
Year over Year Log Difference in Coincident Indicator 1.139*** 0.497* -0.731 0.0193 0.394** 0.570 0.632*** 2.014** 2.299*** 2.634*** 2.061***
(0.178) (0.207) (0.784) (0.726) (0.154) (0.278) (0.196) (0.347) (0.257) (0.255) (0.300)
Constant -0.00489 -0.00978 -0.0233 -0.0336 0.0401** -0.0123 0.0125 -0.0122 -0.0299** -0.0297 0.0270*
(0.00746) (0.0205) (0.0338) (0.0621) (0.0145) (0.0178) (0.00907) (0.0148) (0.00963) (0.0181) (0.0125)
Observations 5,109 117 121 244 1,209 123 1,535 164 942 286 368
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Standard errors are clustered by region by half decade31 
 
Table 7: Cyclicality the Income Tax Base 
 
   














Year over Year Log Difference in Annual Coincident Indicator 0.667*** 0.535*** 0.519* 2.822** 0.796***
(0.0427) (0.0244) (0.296) (1.091) (0.156)
Log Difference in Annual Coincident Indicator 2000 and After 0.417*** 0.136** 5.105*** -2.515** 1.510***
(0.0802) (0.0493) (0.427) (1.104) (0.258)
Dummy=1 if 2000 or Later -0.0122** -0.00101 -0.143*** 0.0366 -0.0454***
(0.00454) (0.00177) (0.0260) (0.0690) (0.0103)
Constant 0.00192 -0.00216 0.0254 -0.0173 0.0250***
(0.00348) (0.00153) (0.0233) (0.0688) (0.00714)
Observations 1,493 1,493 1,493 1,477 1,195
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Standard errors are clustered by region by half decade32 
 
 
Table 8: Cyclicality of Adjusted Gross Income and Its Components Including Year Fixed Effects: 1980-2009 














Year over Year Log Difference in Annual Coincident Indicator 0.499*** 0.493*** 0.581*** -0.621 0.366**
(0.0350) (0.0348) (0.100) (0.760) (0.146)
Log Difference in Annual Coincident Indicator 2000 and After 0.0858 0.0466 0.274 1.107 0.887**
(0.102) (0.0964) (0.304) (0.767) (0.370)
Constant 0.00284 0.00178 0.148*** -0.197*** 0.0144
(0.00330) (0.00468) (0.0287) (0.0397) (0.0160)
Observations 1,493 1,493 1,493 1,477 1,195
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Including Year Dummies, Standard errors are clustered by region by half decade33 
 
















































Year over Year Log Difference in Annual Coincident Indicator -0.466 -0.840*** -0.610*** -0.450*** -0.453* -0.734*** -0.519**
(0.305) (0.184) (0.213) (0.0995) (0.226) (0.254) (0.202)
Log Difference in Annual Coincident Indicator 2000 and After 1.609*** 0.644*** 0.0313 0.372*** -0.0357 0.846*** 0.302
(0.329) (0.195) (0.375) (0.109) (0.312) (0.300) (0.230)
Dummy=1 if 2000 or Later -0.0469*** -0.0341*** -0.0723*** -0.0243*** -0.0711*** -0.0466*** -0.0130
(0.0113) (0.00911) (0.0174) (0.00573) (0.0178) (0.00966) (0.00988)
Constant 0.0354*** 0.0338*** 0.0631*** 0.0259*** 0.0590*** 0.0460*** 0.0133
(0.0103) (0.00889) (0.0145) (0.00551) (0.0164) (0.00888) (0.00969)
Observations 1,217 1,219 1,229 1,219 1,230 1,173 1,219
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Standard errors are clustered by region by half decade34 
 
 
Table 10: Breakdowns of Tax Cyclicality 
   

























Year over Year Log Difference in Annual Coincident Indicator 0.185* -0.535*** 0.720*** 0.268 -0.463 0.731*** 0.459** -0.569*** 1.027*** 0.459** -0.346*** 0.804***
(0.107) (0.111) (0.0422) (0.284) (0.306) (0.0399) (0.173) (0.123) (0.125) (0.173) (0.0896) (0.177)
Coincident Indicator 2000 or After 0.874*** 0.553*** 0.320*** 1.920*** 1.611*** 0.309*** 1.656*** 0.511*** 1.145*** 1.656*** 0.116 1.539***
(0.127) (0.121) (0.0882) (0.314) (0.331) (0.0871) (0.210) (0.134) (0.189) (0.210) (0.143) (0.269)
Dummy=1 if 2000 or Later -0.0392*** -0.0298*** -0.00937** -0.0566*** -0.0472*** -0.00942** -0.0489*** -0.0304*** -0.0185* -0.0489*** -0.00315 -0.0457***
(0.00682) (0.00566) (0.00407) (0.0131) (0.0114) (0.00409) (0.0113) (0.00645) (0.00924) (0.0113) (0.00402) (0.0108)
Constant 0.0295*** 0.0290*** 0.000546 0.0359*** 0.0353*** 0.000602 0.0288*** 0.0303*** -0.00153 0.0288*** 0.00410 0.0247***
(0.00593) (0.00545) (0.00297) (0.0109) (0.0103) (0.00299) (0.00878) (0.00614) (0.00551) (0.00878) (0.00346) (0.00797)
Observations 1,247 1,247 1,247 1,217 1,217 1,217 1,155 1,155 1,155 1,155 1,155 1,155
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
standard errors are clustered by region by half decade35 
 
 





   
Rates Base Rates Base Rates Base Rates Base
Pre-2000 Level -289% 389% -173% 273% -124% 224% -75% 175%
Increase 63% 37% 84% 16% 31% 69% 7% 93%















   






























Year over Year Log Difference in Annual Coincident Indicator -0.0245 -0.572* 0.548*** 0.105 -0.647*** 0.751** 2.789** -0.738** 3.527***
(0.306) (0.301) (0.0245) (0.387) (0.144) (0.314) (1.116) (0.268) (0.997)
Coincident Indicator 2000 or After 0.601* 0.493 0.109* 5.304*** 0.262 5.042*** -2.476** 0.848** -3.324***
(0.317) (0.304) (0.0564) (0.428) (0.181) (0.389) (1.122) (0.313) (1.009)
Dummy=1 if 2000 or Later -0.0354** -0.0346** -0.000832 -0.159*** -0.0336*** -0.126*** 0.0161 -0.0493*** 0.0654
(0.0145) (0.0142) (0.00167) (0.0304) (0.00857) (0.0272) (0.0596) (0.00982) (0.0600)
Constant 0.0344** 0.0363** -0.00191 0.0478* 0.0360*** 0.0118 0.00270 0.0464*** -0.0437
(0.0143) (0.0141) (0.00135) (0.0274) (0.00754) (0.0240) (0.0594) (0.00909) (0.0598)
Observations 1,189 1,189 1,189 1,247 1,247 1,247 1,126 1,126 1,126
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Standard errors are clustered by region by half decade37 
 
Data Appendix: 
Quarterly Summary of State and Local Tax Revenues 
1962: Q1- 1963:Q4:  The Quarterly Summary of State and Local Tax Revenues was first collected by the 
Census Bureau in 1962:Q1.  For 1962: Q1-1963:Q4, state revenues are reported for five revenue 
sources: General sales and gross receipts, Motor fuel sales, Individual income, Corporation net income, 
and Motor vehicle and operators’ licenses. In each quarter, for 3-4 of the 36 states with both a 
corporate and individual income tax, a breakdown between individual and corporate income taxes is not 
available, only a combined income tax number.   
1963: Q4 - 1976: Q4: Beginning in 1963: Q4, the corporation income tax number is no longer reported.  
From 1963:Q4-1976:Q4, four revenue sources continue to be reported (General sales and gross receipts, 
Motor fuel sales, Individual income, and Motor vehicle and operators’ licenses.)  For a couple states, the 
reported income tax number includes corporate income tax revenues as well:(Alabama:  1963:Q4-
1969:Q1; Arizona:  1963:Q4;Georgia: 1963:Q4; Louisiana 1964:Q2-1964:Q4; Missouri: 1963:Q4-1969:Q1; 
New Mexico: 1963:Q4-1967:Q1; North Dakota: 1963:Q4-1964:Q3; 1966:Q1-1968:Q1).   By 1969: Q2 no 
state income tax numbers include corporate income taxes.  
1977:Q1-1992:Q2: In 1977:Q1 the survey was expanded to cover seven tax sources (General sales and 
gross receipts, Motor fuel sales, Individual income, Motor vehicle and operators’ licenses, Corporate 
Income, Alcoholic Beverages, Tobacco Product Sales).  The survey also reports Total tax collections 
which combines the seven listed sources and other tax revenue sources.  This coverage continues 
through 1992:Q2.   
1992:Q3-1993:Q2: From 1992:Q3-1993:Q2 quarterly tax revenue data is not reported by the Census 
Bureau due to “staff shortages”.   However, the Census sent us unpublished data for 1992:Q3 and we 38 
 
are able to back out approximations (and in some cases data) based on year-to-date and year-end totals 
from the 1993 and 1994 releases for 1992:4 – 1993:Q2. 
1993:Q3-1993:Q4: Published data for 1993:Q3 and 1993:Q4 is similar to the data available from 
1977:Q1-1992:Q2 and covers seven sources and total revenues. 
1994:Q1-present:  From 1994:Q1-present, the Census Bureau reports data for 26 revenue sources.  Data 
for 22 of these 26 sources is also available in the 1992:Q3 data sent to us.  This data is released 
approximately 90 days after the quarter ends. 
 
State Level IRS Data 
  We use IRS data on adjusted gross income, wage and salary income, dividend income, interest 
income, and capital gains by state. 
Tax Year 1979: Data by state available in Table 5 of the Summer 1981 Statistics of Income Bulletin.   
Tax Year 1980: Data by state available in Table 4.1 of Individual Tax Returns, 1980. 
Tax Year 1981:  Data by state available in Table 4.1 of Individual Tax Returns, 1981. 
Tax Year 1982-1985: Data by state for AGI, salary and wages, interest and dividends available in the 
Statistics of Income Bulletin for one to three years later.  Capital gains data by state was not published.   
We are thankful to William Gentry for sending us this unpublished data.   
Tax Year 1986-1995: Data by state is available in Historical Table 2 of the Statistics of Income Bulletin 
from two or three years later (e.g. Tax Year 1987 is in Fall 1990, Tax Year 1990 is in Fall 1992).  This table 39 
 
has been in the Fall, Summer, Spring, and Winter Bulletin depending on the year.  These Bulletins are 
available from the IRS website at: http://www.irs.gov/taxstats/article/0,,id=117514,00.html. 
Tax Year 1996-present:  Data by state is available in electronic format from Historical Table 2 of the 
Statistics of Income Bulletin.  We obtained this data from the IRS website at: 
http://www.irs.gov/taxstats/article/0,,id=171535,00.html.  
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